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I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW: VIDEOCONFERENCE HEARINGS
AND THE LEGAL LIMIT ON HOW TRIBUNALS ALLOCATE
RESOURCES
Lorne Sossin* & Zimra Yetnikoff*
Videoconferencing has generated ambivalence in the legal community.
Some have heralded its promise of unprecedented access to justice,
expecialyforgeographicalyremote communities. Others, however, have
questioned whether videoconferencing underminesfairness. The authors
explore the impl'cations of videoconferencing through the case study
of the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Tribunal, which is one of the
busiest adjudicative bodies in Canada.This anaysis hig hghts concerns
both with videoconferendng in princp4 and in practice. While such
concerns traditionally have been the province of public administration,
the authors argue that a tribunals allocation of resources and the
suffidengy of its budget are also core concerns of administrativelaw.
Administrative law reaches beyond conventionaldoctrines ofprocedural
fairness on the one hand and substantive rationakit on the other.How
the legislature structuresandfunds decision-making bodies is notjust a
matter of poiticalpreferencebut also of legalsufficeny. The common
law, the Charterof Rights, andunwritten constitutionalprinciplessuch
as the rule of law and access to justice allprovidepotentialconstraints
both on governments and tribunals as to the organizationand conduct
of adjudicative hearings, espedaly in settings like the Landlordand
Tenant Tribunal,where the nghts of vulnerable people are at stake,
While a challenge to the videoconferencingpractices of the Landlord
and Tenant Tribunalhasyet to be brought, the authors conclude that
eventually the intersection of tribunal resources with the fairness and
reasonablenessof that tribunal'sdecision-making will reach the courts.
How the courts resolve these challenges may represent the nextfrontier
of administrativelaw.
La vidioconflrence a susciti de l'ambivalenceau sein de la communaut
juridique. Certains ont proclami sa promesse d'un accs sans
pric6dentd lajustice, surtoutpourles communautsgiograpbiquement
iloignies. D'autres,cependant, ont soulevi la question d savoir si la
vidioconfirence mine l'lquit Les auteurs explorent les consiquences
de l'utilisation de la vid&oconference en faisant une itude de cas du
Tribunaldu logement de l'Ontario,un des organismesjuridictionnels
les plus occups au Canada. Cette anayse met en lumire des
preoccupations en rapport avec la videoconference en principe et en
pratique.Quoique de telles proccupationsont traditionnellementiti
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du ressort de l'administrationpublique, ks auteurs soutiennent que
l'allocationdes ressourcesparun tribunaletla suffisance de son budget
sont galement des proccupations centrales du droit administratif
Le droit administratif va au dela des doctrines conventionnelles
d'6quitiprodduraled'unepartet de la rationalitdsubstantive d'autre
part.Lafafon dont le legislateur organise etfinance les organismes
diddeurs n 'estpas simplement question de prdflrencepolitique mais
aussi de suffisance e'gale. Le common law, la Charte des droits et
les prindpes constitutionnels non &critstels que l'autoriti de la loi
et l'accs d lajustice imposent tous des contraintespotentielks aux
gouvernements et aux tribunaux quant d l'organisationd'audiences
adjudicativeset lafapon de les mener, surtoutdans un cadre tel que le
Tribunal du logement de l'Ontario,oi sont enjeu les droits de gens
vulnirables.Quoique les pratiques de vidoconfdrence du Tribunal
du logement de l'Ontarion'aientpasencore iti contesties, ks auteurs
concluent qu'iventuellement la conjoncture des ressources du tribunal
et de l'dquitd et l'aspect raisonnable du processus de ddsion de ce
tribunalva parvenird la cour. Lafafon dont ks cours rigleront ces
contestationspourraitdevenir le prochain domaine d'exporation du
droit administralif
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative law is traditionally concerned with procedural fairness on
the one hand and substantive rationality on the other. How the legislature
chooses to structure and authorize decision-makers is generally taken to be a
matter of political preference rather than legal sufficiency. The same may be
said for the decisions of government as to the budget of those tribunals. So,
for example, whether a court believes a tribunal may be underfimded or given
an ill-suited mandate to its expertise ought not to play a part in whether the
decisions of that tribunal are upheld or quashed on judicial review. However,
at some point, the structure and resources of a tribunal inexorably brush
up against the fairness and rationality of that tribunal's decisions. If, for
example, a tribunal decides to save money by not producing transcripts of
its hearings or failing to provide adequate space for hearings or not allowing
reasonable access to its prior decisions, these administrative decisions cannot
be neatly disentangled from adjudicative outcomes. We consider this broad
issue from a narrow perspective, that of the experience of a landlord/tenant
adjudicative tribunal and its use of videoconferencing, in part to reduce the
cost of holding hearings involving residents of communities outside large,
urban centres. While the focus is narrow, the issues raised by this examination
are broad - we argue that as a general proposition, it is neither sustainable
nor desirable to sever questions of tribunal funding and structure from the
question of fairness and reasonableness of tribunal decision-making. We
do not suggest that Courts should take leadership over policy preferences
or spending priorities, but rather that the principles of administrative law
should provide guidance and (in some circumstances) constraints on how
governments undertake their preferences and priorities.
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Another aspect of this paper is to consider the intersection of
videoconferencing and adjudication. This technology has generated
considerable interest and a reaction best described as profoundly ambivalent
from the legal community. On the one hand, this technology promises
unprecedented levels of access to administrative decision-making, especially
in rural jurisdictions in Canada characterized by sparse populations and
vast geography. In the criminal justice setting, videoconferencing may save
significant resources now expended on transporting prisoners for court
appearances and witnesses for criminal proceedings. On the other hand,
videoconferencing may serve as an expedient justification for consolidating
hearing venues for tribunals and almost by definition reduce opportunities
for connection and contact as part of the hearing process. Videoconferencing
also creates a potentially deleterious reliance on technology which has proven
uneven. Even small, technical matters such as the ability of a camera to
capture everyone in a room rather than a single speaker can have a substantial
impact on the ability of a party or decision-maker to fully understand and fully
participate in proceedings.
The case study for this analysis will be the Ontario Rental Housing
Tribunal [OHRT] (now renamed the Landlord and Tenant Tribunal), which
has the highest caseload by volume of any adjudicative tribunal in the country.
Largely as a cost-saving measure, it has embraced videoconferencing for
hearings outside major urban centres such as Toronto and Ottawa. We ask
the question of whether this practice infringes the duty of fairness (under
either common law or Charter standards) and further, whether a court by
way of remedy, assuming an infringement of a fairness obligation could be
established, could compel the government to provide more funding to the
tribunal for in-person hearings or other alternatives to videoconferencing.
Videoconferencing, and the use of video for witness testimony in
particular, dearly has progressive potential. Rather than have a child victim
of an assault relive the trauma of the assault by having to recount her or his
experience before the accused person, videoconferencing allows for the child
to be examined or even cross-examined from a secure and more comfortable
location.' Experts who could not be flown in to a trial could, through the use
of video technology nonetheless participate in a hearing.2 In many instances,
this enhances the opportunity for a fair hearing. When used as the norm,
however, rather than as a response to a particular need, many of the benefits
of an oral hearing may be jeopardized.
This paper is divided into three sections. The first section of the paper
explores the OHRT with a view to the importance of resources in addressing

1

2

Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, S.715.1 allows a complainant under the age of 18 to testify by
videotape in relation to offences involving child molestation or sexual assault. The videotape must
be made within a reasonable time after the alleged offence, and is only admissible in evidence if
the complainant adopts the contents of the videotape when testifying in court. Section 486(2.1)
of the Criminal Code allows the presiding judge in similar cases to order that a complainant or
witness under the age of 18 give testimony outside of the courtroom or behind a screen so that
the complainant or witness does not have to see the accused, if this exclusion is necessary to
obtain a full and candid testimony.
See Innisfil(Fownship)v Veipra (Townshil), [1980] 2 S.C.R. 145, where cross-examination was alleged
to be denied because an out-of-town expert was not produced for cross-examination.
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the volume, complexity and vulnerability of parties which characterize its
hearings. The second section considers the judicial response to the use of
video technology in the adjudicative process. While this issue has not been
considered in the context of challenges to the ORHT, our analysis proceeds
by examining analogous judicial settings and administrative tribunal settings
which have been the subject of judicial commentary. The third section of
the paper explores the degree to which procedural or substantive public law
principles may constrain the resource allocation to tribunals such as ORHT.
II. THE ONTARIO RENTAL HOUSING TRIBUNAL: THE
RESOURCES OF JUSTICE
The ORHT holds three types of hearings: hearings where the landlord
and tenant appear before the tribunal, electronic hearings conducted by
telephone or videoconference, and written hearings where the landlord and
tenant submit their evidence in writing to the tribunal. The ORHT is one of
Ontario's "quasi-judicial" tribunals, created with the enactment of the Tenant
ProtectionAct in June, 1998. 3 The Act gives residential landlords and tenants
specific rights and obligations, and sets out a process from how these rights
and obligations can be exercised and enforced. 4 The role of the Tribunal is to
resolve disputes between landlords and tenants, regulate rent increases, and
educate landlords and tenants about their rights and obligations. 5 Members
are appointed to the tribunal by the Ontario Government for specific terms.
The Tribunal is currently composed of one Chair, seven Vice-Chairs, thirty6
two Tribunal members and twelve part-time members.
According to Rule 20 of the ORHT rules, the tribunal may consider
several factors when deciding whether an electronic hearing will be appropriate.
These are: the number of parties to the proceeding, the suitability of the
technology for the subject matter of the hearing, the nature of the evidence
including whether credibility is at issue, the extent to which the matters in
dispute are questions of law, the convenience of the parties and the cost,
efficiency and timeliness of the proceedings.
The ORHT has come under fire in recent years for real and perceived
injustices. In the 2004 Ombudsman Ontario Annual Report, Clare Lewis
wrote in the Ombudsman's Message there were shortcomings to the Tenant
Protection Act. The Ombudsman emphasized that eviction can have severe
consequences on individuals and families, and that the Act's default eviction
process may be having a disproportionate effect on vulnerable tenants such
as seniors, single parents with small children, people with disabilities, and

3
4
5

6

Tenant ProtectionAct, 1997, &O. 1997, c. 24, s.157.
"About Us" Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal online: <http://www.orhtgov.on.ca/userfiles/
HTML/nts_3_5224_1.htrrl>.
Ibid The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (ORHT) was renamed the Landlord and Tenant
Board with the passage of the RejidentialTenandes Act, S.O 2006, c.17, which came into force
January 31, 2007. Because the Tribunal was known as the ORHT during the period of this
research, we have retained this name for the Tribunal in the discussion.
"Members" Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal online: <http://www.orht.gov.on-ca/userfiles/
HTML/nts_3_6153_1.html>.
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those for whom English is a second language.7
The Tribunal's discretion in deciding whether to hold an in-person or
videoconference hearing is also considered by some as a shortcoming that
can similarly have severe effects on those affected. The essential question for
the purposes of this paper is whether a videoconference hearing held against
the wishes of one of the parties would violate the standards of procedural
fairness. The resources in the Northern region of Ontario are currently such
that ORHT hearings will generally take place by telephone or videoconference,
unless there are exceptional circumstances that would dictate otherwise. In the
North, considerations of cost and convenience will thus almost always outweigh
the other Rule 20 considerations. To what extent may the other considerations
under Rule 20 be sidelined before their irrelevance will result in a violation of
procedural fairness? If the statute changed and a videoconference hearing
could be held no matter what factors were involved, could the decision be
challenged for being in violation of procedural fairness?
A. Prevalence of Videoconference Hearing
The region of Northern Ontario is comprised of nearly 90% of Ontario's
land area, covering over 800,000 square kilometers. Despite its size, Northern
Ontario, with a population of approximately 786,440, is home to only 7%
of Ontario's population.' Face-to-face hearings are rare, videoconference and
telephone hearings being the norm.9 Outside of Northern urban centres such
as Sudbury and Thunder Bay, depending on the location, videoconference
hearings are scheduled bi-weekly (North Bay, Sault Ste. Marie), Monthly
(Dryden, Hearst, Kenora, Kirkland Lake, Timmins) and bi-monthly (Elliot
Lake, Fort Frances, Nipigon, Espanola, Geraldton, Wawa).
The costs of videoconferencing vary, and the Ontario Rental Housing
Tribunal does not track the cost of an individual hearing. The Tribunal however
does track overall costs. The Tribunal will generally schedule a hearing block
two months in advance, and facilities are usually booked for two-and-a-half
hours. The Tribunal pays $200.00 per hour to rent videoconference sites, plus
a $50.00 scheduling fee, plus $2.52 per minute for long distance charges. The
average cost of each hearing block is thus between $1,500.00 and $1,700.00,
the variable being long distance charges. In 2003, the Tribunal spent over
$200,000.00 on videoconference facility rental.10
There are relatively few ORHT hearings in Northern Ontario, compared
to the amount of hearings in the rest of the province. However, of the total

7
8
9

10

Ombudsman Ontario Annual Report 2004, Ombudsman Ontario online: <http://www.
ombudsman.on.ca/smuploads/OmbudsmanEngAR04.pdf>' at 2-3.
"Northern Ontario Overview" Ministry of Northern Development and Mines online: <http://
www.mndm.gov.on.ca/mndm/nordev/redb/sectorprofiles/northem-ontario-e.pdf> at p. 1.
While the focus of this paper is on videoconference hearings, it must be noted that numerous
Northern ORI4T hearings, particularly for disputes in the most remote regions, are conducted by
telephone. These hearings are most often conducted by tribunal members in the Southern and
Eastern regions of Ontario. Between January 9 and July 14, 2006, 229 telephone hearings were
conducted for the remote areas of Atikokan, Ear Falls, Kenora, Dryden, Red Lake, Fort Frances,
Sioux Lookout, Timmins and Hudson, among others.
Letter dated June 7, 2005 from Tony Durbacz, District Manager of the Ontario Rental Housing
Tribunal, Sudbury. The letter is on file with the authors.
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Northern hearings, a significant proportion is by videoconference. Between
March 7, 2005 and July 1, 2005, there were a total of 573 scheduled ORHT
hearings in the Northern Region. Of the total Northern hearings, 120, or
20.9%, were videoconference hearings. Videoconference hearings were not
scheduled every week, but on nine days throughout these seventeen weeks. On
the days that videoconference hearings were held, they accounted for anywhere
between 18% and 100% of the Northern hearings scheduled that week."
According to the representatives at the ORHT Northern office,
videoconferencing allows the ORHT to "regularly service remote centers"
for hearings. Due to the vast geographical area of Northern Ontario and
the small number of tribunal members available, the ORHT feels that
videoconference hearings allow disputes to be more promptly heard. When
the ORHT focused on providing face-to-face hearings in all locations, some
applicants had to wait months for their scheduled hearings and tribunal
members had to travel long distances to conduct the hearings.'"
At the beginning of 2006, videoconferencing seemed set to continue
as usual. Between January 3 and March 17, 2006, 75 of the 423 scheduled
Northern hearings, or 17.7%, were videoconference hearings. Since April 2006
however, there has been a dramatic drop in the number of videoconference
hearings, with the proportion of videoconference hearings for the year
dropping to 8.9% by July 14, 2006. This dramatic drop in the proportion
of videoconference hearings is due to the suspension of videoconference
hearings in Sault Ste. Marie. The ORHT held only videoconference hearings
in Sault Ste. Marie for many years, conducting the hearings from the local
community college. However, in March 2006, there was a strike at the college,
and all scheduled videoconference hearings were cancelled. The ORHT
made arrangements for two tribunal members located in Sudbury to attend
hearings in Sault Ste. Marie every two weeks since April. This arrangement is
expected to continue for the foreseeable future. 3 Videoconference hearings
in North Bay were phased out because they were thought to be too difficult,
and were found to be more expensive than conducting in-person hearings in
North Bay. 4
Despite the current drop in videoconference hearings, the enactment
of the Residential TenanciesAct, 2006 may trigger a significant increase in the
amount of videoconference hearings. Section 242(2) of this Act abolishes
default orders that were permissible under s.192 of the Tenant Protection Act,
1997.1' Without default orders, more hearings will have to be held, which will
likely lead to more videoconference hearings as well.
While the following observations of videoconference and in-person
hearings are not intended to present a complete picture, the differences noted
between videoconference and in-person hearings may have a sometimes
subtle and sometimes profound impact on the fairness of the hearing. As

11
12
13
14
15

Statistics calculated from weekly ORI-IT dockets.
Letter from Tony Durbacz, spr note 10.
Communication date July 14, 2006 from Wendy Bird, Community Legal Worker at Algoma
Community Legal Clinic, Sault Ste. Marie. On file with authors.
Communication from Stuart Bailey, Legal Aid Ontario, July 19, 2006.
Sp note 8.
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discussed below in greater detail, a party's ability to maintain eye contact with
a decision maker, the ability to approach the decision maker in private and the
ability to present documents for the decision maker's immediate perusal are
all missing from videoconference hearings. The absence of these "privileges"
routinely available at in-person hearings may make videoconference hearings
appear less fair than in-person hearings.
B. Anatomy of a Videoconference Hearing
In order to assess the fairness of video hearings generally, it is important
to understand the logistics and complexity involved first-hand. Such first
hand accounts of the administrative justice adjudicative settings are rare. The
following is a first-hand account by one of the authors of a videoconference
session in the city of North Bay in the Northern Region of Ontario that took
place in the summer of 2005.16
July 12, 2005
North Bay, Ontario

The hearings took place at Cannadore College, which is about
a ten minute highway drive from the North Bay city centre. The

College is also accessible by bus. We entered the building through
the main entrance. On a wall to our left there was a whiteboard
upon which was written "O.RIH.T. - Room 135" in red marker.
We followed duty counsel through a maze of hallways to Room
135. There was nobody there to greet us or show us the way. The
College was almost deserted.
There was nothing about Room 135 that marked it as a

courtroom or hearing room. There was a long blue conference table
in the centre of the room, surrounded by steel and upholstered
blue chairs. The walls were painted in white and two shades of
green, and the pictures on the wall included a map of Northern
Ontario and a flying duck. The only things that distinguished the
room as a hearing room were the Commissioner seated at the head
of the table and the two televisions at the far end of the room.
On the television screen directly facing the Commissioner, the
adjudicator was silently setting up in Sudbury. On the other screen,
left of the first TV, there was a close-up shot of the conference
table in North Bay, centred on a place card that read "Contact
North - North Bay" and the Commissioner's folded arms.
When we walked in, the chairs around the table were already
filled. We took some extra chairs and placed them against the
wall. The two chairs at the front of the table on either side of
the Commissioner were reserved for the parties to the hearings
and thus left empty. Soon all the chairs were taken and the

16 Aside from some comments about the difficult parties present at this particular hearing, duty
counsel in North Bay did not express any surprise with the proceedings, giving the impression
that this hearing was a routine example of a Northern videoconference hearing, and not out of
the ordinary.
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Commissioner had to send for some more. The additional chairs
were white plastic and a pile of them were placed at the far end of
the room near the TVs. As more people drifted in, they had to lift
a chair from the pile and find a place in the crowded room.
At 9:30 AM, the Commissioner turned the sound on in
Sudbury where the adjudicator, Gerald Naud, was seated. The
adjudicator did not know how to turn on the sound from his end
and had to go for some help. Once the sound issue was resolved,
the adjudicator could not adjust the zoom function on his end.
The second television, which represented the adjudicator's view
of the hearing room, remained focused on the Commissioner's
arms. The adjudicator again called for help and was finally able to
adjust the zoom to a long shot of the room. This shot captured
those sitting at the centre of the room, leaving out all those sitting
on the sides. The adjudicator did not adjust the camera shot again,
so the viewpoint remained the same throughout the hearings.
Problems with the technology, for the purpose of fairness, became
quickly apparent. The adjudicator's image was blurry and it was very hard to
read any expression on his face. The camera could not capture movement
very well either, the image becoming jerky whenever the adjudicator moved.
It was therefore difficult to gauge the adjudicator's body language and
expression, and difficult to read his mood. It quickly became apparent that
the adjudicator had similar difficulty gauging those of us in North Bay. The
first concern was that the adjudicator could not identify the people who were
speaking. When the adjudicator asked if there was duty counsel present, Duty
Counsel stood up and introduced herself, but the adjudicator could not tell
who it was that was speaking. This indicates that the video image did not
capture oral movement, let alone facial expressions. The adjudicator assumed
that duty counsel was a woman sitting at the front of the room in what the
adjudicator characterized as an orange suit. The colours on the video screen
were distorted as well. The woman at the front of the room was not wearing
orange but a salmon colour. People's skin tones were distorted as well, with
most people looking decidedly orange. Those sitting at the front of the room
near the Comnuissioner were also the farthest away from the adjudicator's
point of view, and their faces were in shadow. This was problematic because
the parties to the dispute were told to sit at the front of the room. The images
of those seated closer to the TV screens and away from the Commissioner
were slightly more defined. Furthermore, unlike an in-person hearing where
the parties face the adjudicator, the parties in the videoconference hearing
presented the adjudicator with their profiles. To face the adjudicator, people
had to turn in their seats. When reading from their files or speaking to other
parties, the adjudicator could only see the sides of the parties' faces.
The videoconference hearings were also plagued by a lack of formality
and organization that would normally be present in an in-person heaing.
There were no place cards marking where the parties were to sit, and therefore
no consistency as to how the landlords and tenants placed themselves. Parties
simply sat on the Commissioner's side that was closest to them. The relative
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informality may also have contributed to the adjudicator's difficulty in keeping
control over the hearings. The first case dealt with a dispute over rental arrears.
The parties to the dispute were very emotional, and the tenant kept interrupting
both the landlord and the adjudicator. While the sound transmission was
almost simultaneous, it did not match with up with the image transmission.
Furthermore, since it was difficult to read the adjudicator's expression, it
was impossible to tell when he was beginning to speak. This meant that the
adjudicator and the parties to the dispute frequently began speaking at the
same time, with all three parties talking over each other. The adjudicator
eventually lost his cool, banged his fist repeatedly on his table and yelled at the
tenant to be quiet. While this was the worst situation of the morning, there
were other times when the adjudicator and one of the parties would begin
speaking simultaneously. The Commissioner did not involve himself in the
proceedings at all, even when things seemed to get out of order. There was a
noticeable difference to the proceedings when duty counsel was present. With
duty counsel in the room, there were fewer interruptions and the proceedings
moved at a faster pace.
Another issue that implicated the fairness of the hearings was the parties'
and the adjudicator's inability to exchange documentary information. Some
people had documentation and pictures which they wished to bring to the
adjudicator's attention, but since there was no fax machine available, the
adjudicator could not view the evidence first-hand. In one case, a witness
read a letter she had written to her landlord as evidence in an eviction case.
In another case, a tenant read out a letter from social services. Where new
evidence was introduced, the adjudicator advised the parties to mail copies of
the materials to Ottawa at the end of the hearing.
In sum, the videoconference hearings seemed to work very well for
procedural and undisputed cases. These cases were dealt with quickly and
efficiently, without anyone having to travelvery far and with the OHRT assuming
minimal costs. For the more complicated cases however, the videoconference
hearings seemed to be a poor substitute for in-person hearings, and in some
cases seemed to have an impact on the perceived fairness of the hearing.
One of the biggest differences between in-person and videoconference
hearings is the formality and visible process of in-person hearings. " At the St.
Clair East hearing venue in Toronto on June 24, 2005, there were two officials
in uniform greeting people as they came in, instructing parties to sign in, and
directing them to the dearly marked hearing rooms. At the front of each
room was the decision-makers desk. It was front and centre and closely faced
both the appellant and respondent's tables. There were microphones hanging
over each table and at the back of the room there was an alcove with hangers
so that people could take off their coats in the winter.
The mediator entered the room through a separate door at the back end
of the room. The tribunal member present on this particular day was Ms. C.
King.'" Another notable difference from the videoconference hearing was the
17 These observations of in-person ORHT hearings took place on June 24, 2005, at 79 St. Clair
Avenue East in Toronto.
18 It should be noted that in the opinion of legal aid counsel, Ms. King is one of the more sympathetic
and fair ORHT tribunal members.
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opportunity to observe the tribunal member and judge her demeanour before
the hearings began. Parties were already seated as Ms King set up at the front
of the room and introduced herself Ms. King advised everyone that the docket
was heavy and that she would not be able to get through everything that day.
She gave the parties present the opportunity to approach her desk and speak
with her privately on preliminary matters. This was another aspect of the inperson hearing that was not available in the videoconference hearings.
The first hearing revolved around an issue of credibility, and may have
been difficult to adjudicate through a videoconference hearing. The landlord
had brought an application to remove a tenant for giving notice to terminate
the lease, but the tenant argued that he had verbally agreed with the landlord
to delay the termination. Body language was a key aspect of each party's
testimony. Each party sat forward and looked directly at the member, trying
to catch her eye as she made notes. The tenant was particularly emotional. At
one point, frustrated that he was having trouble getting his point across, he
banged his hands on the table and then hung his head. It was clear that the
tribunal member was having trouble understanding the tenant's side of the
story. She asked him numerous times to tell her all the details and to go over
the story slowly. Ms. King finally decided in the landlord's favour, not being
satisfied that the verbal agreement had been made.
The third hearing involved an application to return a tenant's deposit.
The tenant applicant put a lot of effort into his submission. However, he was
very nervous and decided to stand throughout his presentation. The tenant
brought photographs he had taken to strengthen his position, and was able to
bring them directly before the tribunal member, which would not have been
possible in most videoconference settings.
Another hearing involved an application brought by a residential home
to evict a tenant with a developmental disability. The tribunal member noted
that the case was too complicated to be resolved in the limited time left, and
rescheduled the hearing for another day. Although the tenant was represented
by counsel, the tribunal member made a point of personally addressing the
tenant and asking her whether she had someone to call if she had nowhere
else to go, and advising the tenant to remain on her best behaviour.
Having these particular hearings conducted by videoconference may
have limited fairness to some degree. Particularly in the first case where
credibility was at issue, it was very important for the member to be able to
assess the parties' behaviour. For the application where the applicant found it
more comfortable to stand, it would perhaps have been unfair to make him
sit in order to comply with a camera set-up. The tenant also had the ability
to forward his case by putting physical evidence before the tribunal member.
This would not likely have been possible in a videoconference hearing.
To conclude, the experience of the ORHT with videoconferencing
suggests that there is something tangible lost in the shift from an in-person
proceeding to one mediated by video. That said, videoconferencing also
makes a hearing before the tribunal accessible in a fashion that would not
be possible otherwise without significant resources. Is the trade-off between
fairness and resources justified in the circumstances? What are the legal limits,
if any, which constrain a government or tribunal when it comes to forms of
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hearings or resource allocation in adjudicative settings? It is to this critical
question that our analysis now turns.
III. THE JUDICIAL AMBIVALENCE TO
VIDEOCONFERENCING
The case law on videoconferencing reflects judicial ambivalence and
uncertainty as to the role of courts in overseeing the administrative decisions
and resource allocations of tribunals. As we discuss below, courts have
recognized the advantages and disadvantages of videoconference hearings
and an overarching trend is hard to discern. In our view, it is possible to see
this issue as a delicate balancing exercise, where justifying the potential loss
of fairness or the risk of unreasonable outcomes in light of videoconference
hearings is balanced against questions of access, scarce resources and legitimate
administrative preferences on the one hand and the seriousness of the issue
and impact on the parties on the other.
The judicial ambivalence alluded to above is not hard to find in a review
of the relevant case law on videoconference hearings. Courts have expressed
appreciation for the obvious advantages of videoconferencing, including
reduced costs for transporting inmates to court from jail, and the reduced cost
and increased convenience for those who live far away from urban centers.
From a judge's perspective, the advantages of videoconferencing include
being able to see a witness face-on rather than from an angle, and being able
to adjust the zoom level at which the judge may view the witness. However,
the courts, public advocates and legal academics have also expressed a deep
concern with both the perceived and actual fairness of videoconferencing.
Where the videoconferencing technology is poor or credibility is at issue,
the courts have resisted cost justifications for substituting a videoconference
hearing for an in-person hearing.
This ambivalent response to videoconferencing corresponds to the
advantages and disadvantages noted at the North Bay videoconference
hearings. Where the matters at issue are relatively simple, videoconference
hearings work well, and are convenient and cost efficient for both the parties
and the government. However, when the issue is more complicated or where
emotions run high, it is no longer clear that the cost and efficiency savings of
videoconferencing outweigh the importance of having an in-person hearing.
Where videoconference hearings are standard and in-person hearings the
exception, as is the case in Northern Ontario, the balance between cost and
efficiency and fairness becomes even more precarious. The Tribunal's discretion
to hold an in-person hearing instead of a videoconference hearing is necessary
for videoconferencing to comply with the standards of procedural fairness.
A. The Advantages
Courts have highlighted several advantages to holding a hearing by
videoconference rather than in person. One advantage is the ability to see
the witness face-on and with more clarity. The Yukon Territorial Court in
R. v. Heynen held that camera angles and close-up views enhance the ability
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to assess demeanour.' 9 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Pack-AlI

Manufacturingheld that seeing the witness face-on and in full colour is as good,
0
or arguably better than, seeing the witness obliquely from the witness box3
The British Columbia Supreme Court in R. v. Gibson went so far as to say that

a well-placed camera may enhance the expressions of a witness under crossexamination. 2' The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench in R. v. Dix held that

the technological sophistication of a videoconference facility could safeguard
witness reliability' In other cases, the courts have held that videoconferencing
is just as good as an in-person hearing. 3
Another advantage of videoconferencing is having access to witnesses
who would otherwise be unavailable either due to cost or the witness being
out of the jurisdiction. In K. v. McLean, a witness living in Nanaimo who did
not want to return to the town of Mayo for fear of relapsing into alcohol
abuse was permitted to give evidence by remote testimony24 . In Wright v.
Wasikwski, Ms. Wright was able to call 20 witnesses to give testimony by
videoconference. The cost to Ms. Wright of otherwise bringing those
witnesses to court would have been prohibitive.25 In R. v. Dix, the Crown was
able to use videoconferencing technology to have a witness testify before an
Alberta court from New York before she left for Great Britain, where she
26
would no longer have been available as a witness.
Videoconferencing can also bring significant cost savings to the courts. In
R v. Heynen, one of the first cases where an application to examine witnesses
by videoconferencing was considered, the court emphasized that using video
technology saves court costs. The court noted that video and audio services
should be used as much as possible in the Yukon in order to minimize
outlying communities' financial hurdles in accessing courts. 27 The academic
literature emphasizes the cost savings advantages, as well as the advantages
in terms of physical safety to both those being tried and the general public.
Michael D. Roth demonstrates the sometimes exaggerated cost savings of
videoconferencing in his example of the Unabomber's arraignment, which
took place in New Jersey while Mr. Kaczynski was being held in Sacramento,
California. The estimated cost of transporting Mr. Kaczynski to New Jersey
was $30,000 while the cost of holding the arraignment by video was $45.28
According to Anne Bowen Poulin videoconferencing allows trials to be
open to the public while security costs are kept to a minimum. Prisoners
may also avoid the discomfort of being transported to court. Prisoners also

19
20

[2000] Y.J. No 6 at para. 315 (Yk.Terr.Ct.) (QL)[Hynen].
Pack All Manioacmuring Inc. v. Triad Plastics Inc. [2001] O.J. No. 5882 at par. 6 (On.Sup.Ct.) (QL)
[Pack-AllManufactuinq.
21 [2003] B.C.J. No 812 at para. 5 (B.C.S.C.) QL).
22 [1998] AJ No. 486 at para. 24 (A.B.QB.) (QL)[D&J.
23 See Magao Hoding [2003] O.J. No. 1810 (OmSup.Ct.) (QL), JS. v. Canada [2003] S.J.No.44 (Sk.
QB.) (QL).

24 [2002] Y.J. No. 88 atpara. 18 (QL).
25 (2001) 52 OR. (3d) 410 at paras 5, 12 (On.Sup.Ct). The cost of bringing these witnesses from
the U.S. to Toronto would have amounted to $20,000.
26 Dix, supra note 22 at para. 1.
27 Hynen, sup note 19 atpara. 321.
28 Michael D. Roth, "Laissez-Faire Videoconferencing. Remote Witness Testimony and Adversarial
Truth" (2000) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 185 at 190.
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have the benefit of being released earlier if the court orders a release by
videoconference. Finally, more cases can be handled in a shorter amount of
time with the available court personnel. 9 Gerald G. Ashdown and Michael A.
Menzel point out that videoconferencing reduces judges' travel time in large
districts and reduces the inconvenience to lawyers and witnesses of appearing
in court." Robin Widdison mentions other advantages of videoconferencing.
According to Widdison, videoconferencing may even enhance the ability to
assess credibility because of high quality sound reproduction, action replays,
and the ability of the judge to view the witness from different angles.3'
B. The Disadvantages
In spite of the numerous advantages of videoconferencing, courts
have also recognized some significant shortcomings of videoconferencing.
Videoconferencing technology may not always be of a standard high enough
to guarantee fairness. In R. v. Raj, the court agreed with the defendant's
assertion that the video link made it difficult to assess body language and
discern expressions. Furthermore, there was only a single camera angle
available, and there was a delay between the questions and the witness'
answers. The court concluded that these defaults in the technology impaired
the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence and rejected the use of
videoconferencing in that case.32 In R. v. Gates, the court concluded that video
equipment which did not allow the parties to see and speak to each other
simultaneously violated s.650 of the CriminalCode, which requires the accused
33
to be present at all stages of the trial.

In de Upegui v. Canada (Ministerof CitiZenship and Immigration),34 the Court
noted that videoconferencing did not afford the applicant a fair hearing.
The Court held that given the applicant's circumstances, combined with the
conditions of the hearing, it was unreasonable for the Board, for the reasons
it gave, to conclude that the applicant's testimony was adjusted because she
was lying. The Court noted:
In its reasons, the Board referred to Ms. Gomez as being "visibly
nervous" while testifying and it "found her attitude disconcerting."
A review of the transcript shows that Ms. Gomez was confused
and agitated while giving her testimony. The hearing was not
assisted by the fact that it was held by videoconference. Nor
was the hearing assisted by the very frequent interjections of
the interpreter who, in addition to seeking various clarifications
from counsel and the presiding member, thought it necessary to

29 Anne Bowen Poulin, "Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The Remote
Defendant" (2004) 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1089 at 1098-1101.
30 Gerald G. Ashdown & Michael A. Menzel, "The Convenience of the Guillotine?: Video
Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions" (2003) 80 Deny. U. L. Rev. 63 at 66.
31 Robin Widdison, "Beyond Woolf: The Virtual Court House", online: Proceedings of the Twelfth
British and Irish Law, Education and Technology Association, 1997 at 4 <http://www.bileta.
ac.UK/pages/conference%/o20papers.aspx>
32 [2002] B.C.J. No 678 at paras. 5-6 (B.C.&C.) (QL).
33 [2002] B.C.J. No, 416 at paras. 16-17 (B.C.C.A.) (QL) [Gates].
34 [2007] EC.J. No. 369 (F.C.) (QL).
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provide a running commentary to the presiding member, noting
at one point that Ms. Gomez was crying and at another point
volunteering:
I must say for the record, Madame Member, that
claimant at times is doing faces as she assumes I don't
know if it's the interpreter or all of us that she would
understand what she means without herself even saying.
I don't know how to put it exactly, but I should, I think
say that for the record. Even I sense some surprise on
the part of claimant that she's being asked questions as
if things should be so evident that there should be no
35
questions. Something like that, Madame Member.
The Court in de Upegui advised that in the "very unique and special
circumstances of this case.. the Board make every effort to see that the
' 36
redetermination hearing is not held by videoconference.
The literature goes more into depth on the disadvantages of
videoconference technology and the unfairness that may arise as a result.
Cormac T. Connor notes that a video image is only as good as what it captures.
Bad camera angles, zooms and lighting can all have negative effects on an
adjudicator's ability to fairly assess witnesses. Videoconferencing also restricts
emission of body language signals and makes eye contact, an important
factor in assessing credibility, impossible. 37 Anne Bowen Poulin emphasizes
that technology is never neutral, and the subtle effects of technology are
incredibly important when justice is at stake. Inaccurate impressions may be
made due to an unfavourable camera shot, and non-verbal cues may be lost
or distorted. Videoconferencing cannot replicate normal eye contact either,
which is important in influencing people's interactions and perceptions of
each other. The technology also skews physical appearance, upon which a
lot of discretionary decisions are made. 3' Elizabeth C. Wiggins notes that
seemingly inconsequential changes in camera perspective may significantly
alter evaluations of videotaped confessions. Even judges who have experience
hearing confession evidence are subject to this effect. Information about the
emotional state of the speaker may also be inaccurately transmitted through
videoconference. A middle bandwidth filter is used when auditory information
is transmitted through phone lines cutting off low and high frequencies.
However, information about the emotional state of the speaker is often carried
39
in the higher frequencies, and may be critical to findings of credibility.
Corresponding to the concern of videoconference technology is the
concern that a videoconference session should include all the necessary

35 Ibid at para. 5.
36 Ibid at para. 8.
37 Cormac T. Connor, "Human Rights Violations in the Information Age" (2001) 16 Geo. Immigr.
L.J. 207 at 216-218.
38 Poulin, supranote 28 at 1106-1111.
39 Elizabeth C. Wiggins, "What We Know and What We Need to Know about the Effects of
Courtroom Technology" (2004) 12 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 73 at 737-738.
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technology complementary to a video link. The court in Pack-AllManufacturing
noted that a fax machine is necessary in videoconference hearings in order to
exchange documentation. 40 As noted in the account of the videoconference
hearing in North Bay, without a fax machine, adjudicators may not review new
documentary evidence and assess the credibility of that evidence at the time
of the hearing.
The concern that videoconference technology will negatively impact
credibility assessments is also a recurrent theme in the case law. The court
in Lena v. Kamploops held that a personal audience before the court may not
always be necessary, and that hearings may be conducted in writing or by
telephone or videoconference. However, the court emphasized that where
there is an issue of credibility, or where a witness must handle an exhibit,
holding a hearing by videoconference may be unjust.41 In R. v. Fleuy, the court
held that it would be potentially prejudicial to the accused if a witness were
not cross-examined in person when credibility was at issue.42 Finally, the court
in R. v. Chapple held that where credibility is at issue, the court should be very
43
reluctant to forego having a witness physically present in court.
One seemingly irresolvable dilemma of videoconference hearings is the
defendant's inability to be effectively represented. In Rusu v. INS this dilemma
is characterized as a Catch-22 situation. If the lawyer is present on video with
the client, he can effectively advise his client but may not be able to effectively
interact with the judge. If the lawyer is present in the courtroom, he forfeits
the ability to privately advise his client.' This problem is revisited several
times in the literature on the subject. In the criminal law context, Ashdown
and Menzel note that videoconferencing forces defense counsel to decide
4
between being in court with the judge and prosecutor or with the client. 1
According to Elizabeth C. Wiggins, whatever choice defence attorneys make
- to be with their client or be present in the courtroom - their decision may
46
interfere with the defendant's right to adequate representation.
Finally, videoconference hearings may fundamentally challenge perceptions
of fairness. In tv. Gates, the court noted that the technological problems
experienced with videoconferencing are not minor problems but affect the
fairness of the entire proceeding. In United States v. Baker,the court held that an
in-person hearing is important because it gives the accused an opportunity to
make a good impression before the judge. Videoconferencing undermines this
ability and thereby the applicant's confidence in the impartiality and fairness of
the hearing47 . In R v. Fecteau the court emphasized that the human element of
the courtroom is of the utmost importance.
It is one thing for a judge to sentence to imprisonment a live
human being who stands physically before the judge in open court.
40

Pack-All Manfacturing,supra note 20 at para. 8.

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Lena v. Kamloqs ReIionalCorrectionalCentre [2000] B.C.J. No. 2262 at para. 26 (B.C.SC.) (QL).
[2004] S.J. No. 242 at para. 17 (Sk.Prov.Ct.) (QL).
[2005] B.C.J. No. 585 at para. 52 (B.C.S.C.) (QL).
(2002), 296 F (3d) 316 at 322-323 [Rusu].
Ashdown and Menzel, supranote 29.
Wiggina, supra note 38 at 737.
(1995) 45 F 3d 837 at 845
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The judge, before imposing a term of imprisonment, at least has
to look the accused in the eye. It may be quite another thing to
sentence to imprisonment a disembodied television image that
appears on a screen on the judge's dias (sic).'
In the context of the ORHT, the concern may be a similar lack of a human
element in depriving people of their homes.
The academic literature on videoconference hearings also emphasizes the
more abstract fairness issues engaged by long-distance justice. Frederic Lederer
points out that this loss of humanity is videoconferencing's ultimate threat.
Virtual trials threaten the solemnity of the courtroom. Furthermore, respect
for the law and justice would suffer if the public were to feel that the system
is becoming unfair.49 Ashdown and Menzel also note that videoconferencing
undermines the solemnity of court proceedings. They emphasize that the
form and process of the judicial system are more than mere trappings. Form
and process are the pillars that support the structure of the justice system
just as ceremony and ritual reinforce the solemnity of religious practice
According to Justice Joseph Goodwin, the court's moral authority rests on
the public perception that its proceedings are fair and just. Justice Goodwin
has expressed concern that videoconferencing will tarnish the public's view
of the integrity of the judicial process, thus calling the court's authority into
question." According to Nancy Gertner, there is a certain formality attached
to courtroom proceedings that is lost through videoconferencing." However,
Gertner allows that formality may not always be desirable, depending on the
context and circumstances of an individual's case. 2
When examined on a case by case basis, the implications in the use of
video for the fairness of a hearing may depend on a number of factors. What
this contextual review, which is typical of how the issue arises for courts, does
not consider, is the broader policy discretion to introduce video hearings as a
cost-saving measure. Few would disagree that in certain circumstances, video
has the potential to compromise the fairness of a hearing. In light of the fact
that video may compromise the fairness of a hearing, the question becomes
when is a video hearing justified? It is hardly controversial to suggest that it
is justified where there are specific benefits (e.g. protecting a juvenile witness
from having to face an accused in open court). The controversy arises, in
our view, when one asks whether the use of videoconference hearings, and
the attendant risk of unfair or unreasonable outcomes, may be justified as a
measure to save money while providing access to more remote population
centres. To what extent can and should procedural fairness obligations
constrain the state's allocation of resources to adjudicative administrative
bodies? It is to this question that we now turn.
(1989) 71 C.R (3d) 67 at para. 27 (On.Sup.Ct.)
Frederic I. Lederer, "The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today's - And
Tomorrow's - High-Technology Courtrooms" (1999) 50 S.C.L Rev. 799 at 28 [Lederer, "The
Road to the Virtual Courtroom"].
50 Ashdown and Menzel, supra note 29 at 68.
51 Nancy Gertner, "Videoconferencing Learning Through Screens" (2004) 12 Win. and Mary Bill
Rts. J. 769 at 784.
52 Patricia J. Williams, The Alchey of Rate and Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
48
49
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IV. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS ON
RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR TRIBUNALS
In light of the analysis above of the ORHT and the judicial response to
videoconferencing generally, in this section we ask, under what circumstances,
if any, would a decision to hold an ORHT hearing by videoconference in
order to save the costs of an in-person hearing be deemed procedurally unfair
or substantively unreasonable by a Court?
A. Procedural Fairness Constraints
The first question is whether videoconferencing can serve as a substitute
for an in-person hearing so as to satisfy an applicant's right to be heard where
an oral hearing is required.
The content of procedural fairness is variable and will be decided on
a case-by-case basis.53 According to Khan v. University of Ottawa, a full oral
hearing will be required where credibility is at issue.14 Depending on the
case at hand and the level of procedural fairness required, it may be that a
videoconference hearing will suffice to fulfill the requirement of a full oral
hearing. However, where the level of procedural fairness required is high,
it is not clear that videoconferencing will be considered fair. The question
is whether the technology is accepted as a viable alternative to an in-person
hearing. In other words, video does not necessarily meet or infringe this sort
of standard. The burden lies on the aggrieved individual to demonstrate an
infringement. In order to discharge this burden, it will be necessary to establish
that video either is inherently less fair than in-person hearings or specifically
so in a given case in light of the circumstances.
According to Fred Lederer, experimental work done by the Courtroom
21 project shows that when done properly, videoconference hearings are
an effective substitute for in-person testimony." However, the majority of
the academic commentary on the issue disagrees with this point of view,
emphasizing that videoconferencing should not be considered such a
substitute. In Ruminations, Lederer concludes that absent extreme necessity
or reliability, courtroom technology should not be used for fear of violating
the social contract. According to this contract, efficiency may not be achieved
at the cost of acceptance for fear of a loss of legitimacy. 6 In another article,
Lederer notes that it is unclear whether the population is prepared to interpret
live, electronically conveyed testimony as the human equivalent of in-court
testimony.5 7 Some authors are unequivocal in their opinion that video presence
is not an adequate substitute for physical presence.
53 See Baker v. Canada (Minister of Gtienship & Immigation) [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817: The content of
procedural fairness will vary depending on the nature of the decision being made, nature of the
statutory scheme, importance of the decision to the people affected, legitimate expectations and
agency's choice of procedures
54 (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 535 (C.A.)
55 Frederic I. Lederer, "Ruminations on Public and Professional Perceptions of TechnologyEnabled Dispute Resolution and Their Effects" Courtroom 21 Court Affiliates Conference, San
Francisco, CA, May 2005 at 6 [Lederer, "Ruminations"]

56 Ibid at p. 15,9.
57

Lederer, "The Road to the Virtual Courtroom," supra note 47 at 28.
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Gerald G. Ashdown and Michael A. Menzel note that while attending a
videoconference hearing is better than not attending any proceeding at all, it is
not as good as being physically present in the courtroom. Presence exists along
a gradient and video presence should be considered as a class in itself.' The
essential question thus becomes whether due process and the appearance of
fairness can be maintained through the use of videoconferencing. The authors
conclude that whatever the answer to this question, videoconferencing should
be allowed in clear, general circumstances where special circumstances exist and
the interests of justice warrant its use.59 According to Nancy Gertner, there is a
clear difference between videoconferencing and face-to-face communication.
Personal communication allows you to observe things about people you would
not otherwise see through a camera. There is also a certain formality attached to
the courtroom that is lost through videoconferencing. 6° Face-to-face testimony

6
increases the information available to the trier of fact. '

The opinion that videoconferencing cannot substitute for in-person
hearings, is echoed in the case law. The British Columbia Supreme Court
in R. v. Chapple held that s.714.1 of the Criminal Code, which allows
videoconferencing, does not replace the established procedure of having
witnesses appear in court Rather, the rule supplements normal practice
and allows the use of technology where appropriate. 62 To determine where
videoconferencing will be appropriate, the judge must consider the nature of
the evidence. Where credibility is at issue, a judge should be very reluctant
to deprive herself of the chance to see the witness in person before her.63 In
Pack-All Manufacturing v. Triad Plastics, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
held that videoconferencing may take place where the advantages of the
technology overcome the traditional rule that evidence be given in person in
court.' In Rusu v. INS, the court quoted from the decision in R. v. Lawrence
where the court held that "virtual reality is rarely a substitute for actual
presence and.., even in an age of advancing technology, watching an event
on the screen remains less than the complete equivalent of actually attending
it." 6 The court in Rusu also quoted from the decision in Edwards v. Logan,
where the court held that "[v]ideo conferencing. .. is not the same as actual
presence, and it is to be expected that the ability to observe demeanor, central
to the fact- finding process, may be lessened in a particular case by video
conferencing. This may be particularly detrimental where it is a party to the
case who is participating by video conferencing, since personal impression
may be a crucial factor in persuasion."66
A side issue is whether videoconferencing can satisfy procedural fairness
at all, and whether it can satisfy hearing requirements where oral hearings
are not necessary. There is no objection in the case law to videoconferencing
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Ashdown and Menzel, supm note 29 at 69, 105.
Ib'd at 109.
Gertner, supra note 49 at 783-784.
Ibid at 786.
Chappk, supra note 42 at para. 50.
Ibid at para. 52.
Pack AllManufaciutin, supra note 20 at para- 11.

65 Rums,sup note 43 at 322.
66 Ibid at p. 322.
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where an oral hearing is not otherwise required. However, a question is raised
in the literature as to whether videoconferencing can ever be fair because it
admits factors that would otherwise be excluded in telephone and written
hearings. According to William R. Anderson, videoconferencing is a new
technology and may intimidate people, negatively affecting their presentation.
Compared to video technology, the telephone is familiar and non-threatening,
can be used in the convenience of one's home and does not let personal
appearance, dress or environment become factors in the case.67 This suggests,
however, that as video phones, web cams and related technology become
commonplace, such concerns may fade. Technological representations
of individuals, however, still cannot be equated to in-person encounters.
According to Michael D. Roth, video can exaggerate personal traits that are
commonly used to evaluate demeanour, such as blemishes, shadows and hair
6
growth. Video can add weight and emphasize scars.
To summarize, videoconferencing will more often than not diminish the
fairness of a proceeding. For the many reasons set out above, however, it will
not do so in every case. Thus, it would be difficult to suggest that the move
to video hearings by ORHT in the Northern Region could, as a whole, be
impugned on fairness grounds alone.
1. Issue of Fettering Discretion
In Northern Ontario where there is arguably no option to have an inperson hearing because of the funding and administrative decisions of the
Tribunal, can it even be said that decision makers exercise discretion in deciding
when an electronic hearing will be appropriate? If a Tribunal has the statutory
discretion to hold hearings in person or electronically, but it is not open for a
tribunal to hold in-person hearings in certain regions due to a policy direction
or resource constraints, it is arguable that the tribunal's discretion has been
fettered improperly.69 This also can negatively affect the independence of
tribunal members, who may feel pressured to find that an electronic hearing
will cause no significant prejudice where there is no practical alternative.
2. Issue of Misuse of Discretion
In addition to the issue of fairness and the fettering of discretion, the
decision to hold a hearing by videoconference may itself represent the misuse
of a discretionary power.
Discretion is never absolute and always implies good faith and acting in a
fashion consistent with a decision-maker's enabling statute.7" The exercise of
discretion is characterized by one, whether the language of discretion is used,
two, the nature of the interests being protected given the consequences of
the decision, and three, the character of the decision-maker, i.e. whether they
67 William K. Anderson, "Technology and the Washington State Administrative Process - Some
Preliminary Notes" (2004) 79 Wash. L. Rev. 13 at 19.
68 Roth, supra note 27 at 198.
69 See Thamotharem v. Canada (Ministerof Gtienshbi and Immgration) 2007 FCA 198, discussing the
validity of a guideline encouraging the reverse order of submissions by the parties, as long as the
tribunal members retain the ability to waive the policy in appropriate circumstances.
70 Roncarelh'v Dupkssis [1959] SC.J. No. 1 (QL), Bakeru Canada(Ministerof Gtiynsbi and lmmiraion)
[1999] SC.J. No. 39 (QL), CUPE u Ontario (Ministerof Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539.
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have the appropriate expertise. In the context of the OHRT, the language of
discretion is used. According to Rule 20.1 of the ORHT rules, in deciding
whether to hold an electronic hearing, a Tribunal may consider any relevant
factors, including (a) the number of parties to the proceeding, (b) the subject
matter of the hearing, (c) whether credibility is at issue, (d) the extent to
which the matters in dispute are questions of law, (e) the convenience of the
parties and (f) the cost, efficiency and timeliness of the proceedings.
According to Rule 20.2, a party who objects to an electronic hearing must
set out how an electronic hearing would cause them significant prejudice. These
provisions are significantly permissive, giving the Tribunal the discretion to
consider these factors or not. There is no provision that these factors must
be considered once an application is made under rule 20.2 either. However,
according to Rule 5.2(2) of the Statuary Powers Procedure Act [SPPA], a
Tribunal shall not hold an electronic hearing if a party satisfies the Tribunal that
holding an electronic rather than an oral hearing is likely to cause the party
significant prejudice. This rule reduces discretion somewhat, but not by much.
The Tribunal must still be satisfied that an electronic hearing will cause significant
prejudice, and this will be measured by the permissive criteria set out in Rule
20.1. Depending on the case before the Tribunal, the nature of the interests
protected may be significant Finally, it is supposed that the decision-makers on
the Rental Housing Tribunal will be held to have the appropriate expertise. It
will therefore be difficult to find an abuse of discretion where a Tribunal decides
to hold an electronic hearing as opposed to a hearing in person.
While it may be possible for Tribunal members to avoid a judicial review
on this basis, if a decision-maker did justify the recourse to an electronic or
video hearing solely on the grounds of government or tribunal direction to
save money, this could (and, in our view, should) be grounds to invalidate the
decision as an unreasonable exercise of the decision-maker's discretion. The
decision-maker has a statutory obligation to consider a range of factors but
the available resources of the tribunal or the government, significantly, is not
one of them.
B. Charter constraints
Where the Charterthreshold is met (that is, the s.7 standard of a right to
life, liberty or security of the person), this provides an additional constraint
on government or tribunal preferences, and one which cannot be superceded
by more express legislative direction. Once the threshold is met, the content
of the Charters procedural fairness obligations are similar (if not identical)
to the common law fairness obligations. 71 According to the Supreme Court
in Singh, an oral hearing will be necessary where there is a serious issue of
credibility 2 Therefore, an applicant who could prove that credibility is at
issue may argue that the Tribunal's limited ability to grant an in-person rather
than a videoconference hearing violates his right to security of the person.
An applicant may also argue that having videoconference hearings in
71
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Northern Ontario while other Ontario residents have access to regular inperson hearings results in inequality before the law, as defined by s.15(1)
of the Charter.In the wake of Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources
Development),73 the first step in a section 15(1) analysis must be the determination
of the appropriate comparator group.74 The appropriate comparator group in
turn must be identified in light of the legislation at issue.75 As noted above,
the stated purpose of videoconference hearings is to regularly service remote
centers and to allow disputes in Northern areas to be more promptly heard.
The purpose of the legislation may thus be characterized as an attempt to
facilitate hearings in remote areas so as to best approximate the readier tribunal
hearing services available in urban centers. Where this attempt fails and in fact
causes disadvantage to those whose hearings are held by videoconference, the
appropriate comparison will be between remote residents, who are subject to
videoconference hearings, and urban residents, who are not habitually subject
to the same technology.76
Any comparison on the basis of residence will have to take account of the
Supreme Court's decision in R v. Turpin. In Turpin, an accused challenged the
fact that a person accused of one of the offences listed in s.427 of the Criminal
Code may opt under s.430 of the Code to be tried by judge alone in Alberta, but
there was no such opportunity for those outside of Alberta. 77 The Supreme
Court held that the ability of an accused to be tried before a judge alone in
one province and not another, violated his/her right to equality before the law.
The opportunity to be tried by a judge alone instead of by a judge and a jury
may have been to the advantage of the accused, but this advantage was only
available to those accused in Alberta.78 The Court however went on to hold
that this differentiation in treatment was not discriminatory. In examining
the larger context, the court determined that there was no disadvantage that
existed apart from and independent of the legal distinction. 79 People accused of
crimes listed in s.427 of the Code resident in all provinces except Alberta could
not be properly characterized as a discrete and insular minority. Moreover,
there is no indication that those accused of offenses listed under s.427 of the
Code outside of Alberta suffer from any more stereotyping, disadvantage or
vulnerability than those accused of these crimes in Alberta.'
Although the Court in Turpin dismissed the s.15 claim, the Court was
careful to leave the door open for future findings of discrimination based
on place of residence. Wilson J., writing for the court, emphasized that she
"would not wish to suggest that a person's province of residence or place
of trial could not in some circumstances be a personal characteristic of the
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individual or group capable of constituting discrimination."'" The differences
between the North and South within Ontario may be the sort of regional
disparity that could give rise to a successful claim under s.15 of the Charter.
To find that place of residence is an analogous ground under s.15 (1)
of the Charterin this case, a claimant would have to show that residents of
Northern Ontario as a group are a "discrete and insular minority" who come
within the protection of s.15 (1), "in the context of the place of the group in
the entire social, political and legal fabric of our society".' It may be possible
to make a viable argument that residents of Northern Ontario do qualify as
such a discrete and insular minority and thus do constitute a group for whom
residence is an analogous group under s.15(1).
Northern Ontario is plagued by a variety of problems, including
"small local markets at a distance from larger markets, lack of economic
diversification, an aging population and youth migration, government
dependency and lack of invesfnent potential." 3 Northern Ontario's present
condition is, in many ways, attributable to its history. Northern Ontario
failed to develop an independent economic engine due to the cycles of
expansion and contraction of its resource-based communities, dictated by
provincial, national and global needs.' Northern Ontario continues to be at
a disadvantage, as indicated by present unemployment and education levels.
Unemployment rates in Northern Ontario are consistently higher than in any
other part of Ontario," with jobs in the "blue collar" industries being the
largest single group of jobs in the regional economy.8 6 Northern Ontario has
lower education levels than the rest of Ontario as well. Northern Ontario has
31% more people with less than a Grade 9 education than the rest of Ontario
and 31.3% more people without a high school diploma. The most significant
difference however, is the attainability of a university degree. In Ontario,
19.2% of people over the age of 20 have a university degree. In Northern
Ontario, this percentage is only 10.7%, for a difference of 44%.87 The fact
that Northern Ontario residents are routinely subject to videoconference
hearings while other Ontario residents are not, in light of Northern Ontario's
disadvantages, could lead to a finding of discrimination based on place of
residence.
If a claimant does succeed in characterizing place of residence as an
analogous ground and succeeds in identifying urban residence as the appropriate
comparator group for a s.15 (1) claim, the claimant must still show that there
has been discrimination in a substantive sense. The claimant must, in other
words, demonstrate that videoconference hearings disadvantage residents of
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Northern Ontario "in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of
presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy
of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society,
equally deserving of concern, respect, and consideration." 8 The Court in Law
identified several contextual factors to aid in the determination of whether
there has been discrimination in a substantive sense. These are: (1) pre-existing
disadvantage, stereotyping, prejudice or vulnerability; (2) the correspondence,
or lack thereof, between the ground on which the claim is based and the actual
need, capacity, or circumstances of the claimant group; (3) the ameliorative
purpose or effects of the impugned law upon a more disadvantaged person or
group and (4) the nature and scope of the interest affected. 9
If residence in Northern Ontario is accepted as an analogous ground under
s.15 (1) for the purposes of this claim, it is likely that a court would also accept
the assertion that residents of Northern Ontario experience disadvantage. The
first contextual factor would thus be met. With respect to the correspondence
factor, it must be noted that the purpose of videoconference hearings in the
North is to facilitate regular hearings in remote centers and to allow disputes
in Northern areas to be more promptly heard. Where videoconference
hearings impede a person's ability to have his or her disputes heard and settled
it is unlikely that a court will find correspondence between the provision of
videoconference hearings and the needs, capacities and circumstance of the
claimant group. There is no indication that videoconference hearings were
implemented to ameliorate the circumstances of another disadvantaged group.
This contextual factor would thus be of limited consequence. Finally, a court
may find that the nature of the interest affected is significant. People who come
before the Rental Housing Tribunal may be at risk of losing their homes.
Even if a court were to find no direct discrimination on the basis of place
of residence, subjecting only those in the North to videoconference hearings
may also give rise to a claim of adverse effect discrimination. 43% of Ontario's
Aboriginal population lives in Northern Ontario, comprising over 10% of
Northern Ontario's population.' The population north of the 50 parallel is
almost entirely made up of Aboriginal communities.9 The disadvantages faced
by the Northern Ontario population relative to the rest of Ontario are even
more pronounced in Northern Ontario's Aboriginal population. Aboriginal
labour force participation rates are lower than labour participation rates for
92
the region as a whole, while Aboriginal unemployment rates are higher.
Educational levels for Northern Ontario's Aboriginal communities are also
lower than the average for both the region and the province.9' If it can be
shown that Ontario's Aboriginal population is disproportionately affected by
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videoconference hearings, the ORHT's Northern videoconference hearings
may be challenged on the grounds of adverse effect discrimination. A claimant
would then have to demonstrate the existence of substantive discrimination,
in a similar manner to the analysis outlined above, in order to prove adverse
effect discrimination under s.15(1).
Leaving aside the challenges of sustaining an equality claim based on
resources allocated to one region over another, there is a broader equality
issue at the root of the videoconferencing which is the "equal benefit of
the law." The language which introduces s.15 sets out that every individual
"is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination..." A person who comes
before a tribunal in Northern Ontario should not have less of a hearing than
one who comes before that same tribunal in Ottawa or Toronto. Cost and
geography require compromises but the question which merits attention is
whether a particular compromise in a particular circumstance is justified.
If a section 15 challenge were accepted, the analysis would then turn to
section 1 of the Charter,where the Supreme Court appears more willing than
ever to defer to a government's preferences in terms of spending decisions.
The high-water mark of this new deference is Newfoundland (Freasury

Board) v. Newfoundland and LabradorAssociation of Public and Private Employees
(NA.P.E.).94 In this case, Newfoundland decided to abandon a Pay Equity
Settlement to its female civil servants on grounds of fiscal austerity. While
accepting that this constituted a violation of the affected women's s. 15 rights,
the Court upheld the decision under s.1 as a reasonable limit on those rights.
The Court required no empirical foundation for the provincial government's
claim, nor any explanation for the government's prioritizing certain needs
ahead of those at issue. While the Court acknowledged a government may
be compelled to divert scarce resources to hospitals and schools, it could just
as easily have concluded that the government deprived vulnerable workers
of their due so as to pave more roads or spend tax dollars on the travel of
cabinet ministers.
This approach stands in stark contrast to the Court's first articulation of
principle in relation to s. 1, which took place in circumstances more analogous
to the concern over videoconferencing. In Singh, the Court found that the
then refugee determination process denied claimants their s.7 rights because
they had no opportunity for an oral hearing before the decision-maker in
their case. With respect to s.1, Wilson J., on behalf of the three judges who
decided the case under the Charter,held:
Certainly the guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they
could be ignored because it was administratively convenient to
do so. No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by
adopting administrative procedures which ignore the principles of
findamental justice but such an argument, in my view, misses the
point of the exercise under s. 1. The principles of natural justice
and procedural fairness which have long been espoused by our

94 [2004] 3 SC.R. 381.
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courts, and the constitutional entrenchment of the principles of
fundamental justice in s. 7, implicitly recognize that a balance of
administrative convenience does not override the need to adhere
to these principles.9"
The Court more recently has suggested that it will defer more to governments
respecting the infringement of social and economic rights than legal rights
such as procedural fairness. Where such a principle could reconcile Singh and
N.AP.E., it is dear fairness will rarely be resource neutral.
In this section, we have canvassed the possible legal limits on administrative
and budgetary decisions to opt for a particular kind of hearing. These limits
are at best a smudged and dotted boundary - bright lines in this area are not
to be found (and likely not to be desired either). A successful legal challenge
to a tribunal's decision to employ videoconferencing is unlikely in general,
though possible where particular circumstances suggest an unjust result tied to
the absence of an in-person hearing. The Court has, to this point, shied away
from the proposition that a government's spending on administrative justice is
limited by constitutional or administrative law. Still, it is dear that public law and
public administration are intertwined in the life of a tribunal and that, at some
point, the rule of law and the budgetary choices of government converge.

V. CONCLUSION
While creative lawyers would have arguable positions on the existing
constitutional and administrative law standards whereby compromising
fairness through reliance on videoconferencing breaches the tribunal's legal
duties, there is a clear sense of reticence on the part of courts to head down
this road. We conclude that courts have the mandate (and, consequently,
the obligation) to review the Government's allocation of resources to the
administration of justice (including adjudicative administrative settings). This
flows not just from the specific common law and Charter procedural fairness
obligations set out in the analysis above but also from the rule of law and its
concern that basic minimum entitlements to access be respected.
Just as courts could not permit a government to shut down courthouses
or restrict access to courthouses with impunity, so too courts cannot allow
government funding to adjudicative bodies to be allocated according to policy
preference alone. Administrative tribunals, such as the former ORHT and the
present Landlord and Tenant Tribunal, are creatures of statute, and it is open in
those statutes to provide for oral hearings, electronic hearings, written hearings
or no hearings at all, however, where hearings are contemplated, fairness requires
a certain reasonable investment of resources to support such adjudication.
To say that the allocation of resources to administrative tribunals is a
relevant matter for a court to consider in the context of a judicial review of
a tribunal's decisions is not to say it is appropriate or desirable for courts to
micromanage the affairs of tribunals or that it is illegitimate for government to
cut budgets where it is deemed necessary. It is simply a matter of recognizing
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the obvious; that is, that respecting fairness will in almost every case require
resources. It is simply not tenable for courts to assert that they have carriage
over every aspect of procedural fairness except what in many cases will be
the determinative one. Thus, in Singh, the Court did not dictate how much
the federal government had to spend on refugee determination proceedings,
but the Court did direct that an oral hearing was required in circumstances
where none was then provided. The result was, of course, a significant new
cost for the Government. Such resource choices remain for government.
It is further the government's policy of providing a refugee process or
dispute resolution for landlords and tenants that also remains a choice. Once
government makes choices which establish adjudicative settings, the court
may defensibly impose constraints on how those settings are structured and
funded. In light of this, it is surprising how rarely courts have considered the
resource allocation for adjudicative bodies as part of its procedural review
(whether under administrative law or Charterprinciples). While a challenge
on this basis has yet to be brought in the context of the ORHT, we would
suggest that this is an appropriate setting to test a broader approach to the
procedural obligations of tribunals in relation to videoconferencing.
While such a challenge could represent a modest advance in the
jurisprudence, and a salutary recognition of the concrete implications of
the rule of law for adjudicative settings, it may have widespread and more
important benefits for how administrative bodies are designed and constituted.
These legal norms regarding the sufficiency of budgetary and administrative
structures for a particular adjudicative task are best integrated when a tribunal
is being designed, not when its decisions are being challenged. As courts
clarify such obligations, government and legislative framers of these tribunals
can ensure they comply with such norms at the outset.
Where governments wish or need to make strategic decisions based on
scarce resources, these legal norms may provide guidance as to how such
decisions will enhance the capacities and credibility of tribunals rather than
jeopardize their ability to deliver administrative justice. Ultimately, however, it
may be that the cost of administrative justice is more than what a particular
government can afford or wishes to spend - in such cases, the rule of law
considerations must prevail. While some constitutional concepts such as
judicial independence may apply only to courts and not to administrative
tribunals, other concepts follow the rights at issue and the impact on those
affected rather than on the body which has been delegated the power to
decide. The rule of law, surely, is one such constitutional aspect The rights of
tenants facing the loss of their home, is an example of where the rule of law
must apply, whether government decides to delegate dispute resolution to a
court or to a tribunal. The rule of law, moreover, is not self-executing. While
it may fall to the courts to articulate the contours of the rule of law, it falls to
the executive to make the rule of law real in its day-to-day decision-making
environments. We can think of no question for administrative law of greater
significance than how the executive discharges this obligation.

